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This article presents a complete picture of the remarkable recent movement in China 
towards allowing an ad hoc arbitration that originates in the numerous Free Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”). This article analyzes the decision of the Chinese judicial system to consider the 
validity of an ad hoc arbitration agreements, which are currently subject to strict prohibition 
by the Chinese Arbitration Law. The article then analyzes the Chinese Supreme People’s 
Court’s (“SPC”) recent announcement regarding open ad hoc arbitration originating in FTZs. 
After comparing three available ad hoc arbitration rules, the article describes the numerous 
factors to consider in creating a Chinese model for ad hoc arbitration rules. Taking the 
deficiencies of the legislative and regulatory resources into account, the article also addresses 
several required conditions for conducting ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Ultimately, 
the article argues that China should at least prepare itself in fields of legislation, judicial 
supervision, available arbitration rules, and human resources to construct a workable ad hoc 
arbitration regime. 
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  With China increasingly becoming an important player in the international arbitration 
world, the unique Chinese practice of prohibiting ad hoc arbitration will eventually impede 
the development of arbitration and prevent China from attracting international arbitration 
business. Although the Chinese judicial system, led by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court 
(“SPC”), has promoted a series of judicial reforms and legal rulings to coordinate domestic 
arbitration and international practice, it has not yet properly addressed the subject of ad hoc 
arbitration. After a series of iconic decisions, the SPC has finally found a workable approach 
to get around restrictions of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China,( “CAL”).  
Chinese courts have consistently made divergent and confusing judgments on the validity 
of ad hoc arbitration agreements for domestic, foreign-related, and international disputes. 
When the Chinese arbitration market started to take off, the Chinese arbitration community 
began to discuss whether they have reached the right moment to officially embrace ad hoc 
arbitration. In 2017, the SPC announced that it would experimentally permit ad hoc 
arbitration originating in the Free Trade Zones (“FTZs”). This article indicates that, apart 
from this single announcement by the SPC, the existing Chinese arbitration system is 
woefully underprepared for the emerging ad hoc arbitration market. Before practitioners 
celebrate this meaningful and long-anticipated news, this article proposes that China should 
make more efforts to reform its arbitration system to prepare China in providing adequate 
support for the potential development of the ad hoc arbitration business.  




ad hoc arbitration agreements, which are currently subject to strict prohibition by the Chinese 
Arbitration Law. After analyzing the SPC’s recent announcement and comparing three 
available ad hoc arbitration rules, the article describes the numerous factors to consider for 
creating a Chinese model for ad hoc arbitration rules. Taking the deficiencies of the 
legislative and regulation resources into account, the article addresses several required 
conditions for conducting ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Ultimately, the article argues 
that China should at least prepare itself in fields of legislation, judicial supervision, available 
arbitration rules, and human resources to construct a workable ad hoc arbitration regime. 
2 Reforming Chinese Ad Hoc Arbitration  
a Background 
It is widely known in the international arbitration world that Article 18 of CAL 
implicitly prohibits ad hoc arbitration. Article 18 provides: “If . . . the arbitration commission 
is not agreed to by the parties in the arbitration agreement, or, if the relevant provisions are 
not clear, the parties may supplement the agreement. If the parties fail to agree upon the 
supplementary agreement, the arbitration agreement shall be invalid.”1 This provision means 
that only arbitration agreements designating qualified arbitration institutions or commissions 
are valid in mainland China. Commentators have argued that the underlying purpose of this 
rule is to protect the development of Chinese arbitration institutions.2 Academics have 
 
1 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 8th Standing Meeting Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective 1 Sept. 1, 1995), art 18 (China). 
 
2 Jingzhou Tao & Clarisse von Wunschheim, Articles 16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law: the Great Wall of 





explained that arbitration was a completely new mechanism for the resolution of disputes 
when CAL was promulgated and that China does not have a tradition of arbitration or the 
experience to support effective ad hoc arbitral proceedings.3 To guarantee fairness and 
justice in arbitration, therefore, it was more appropriate to restrain arbitral jurisdiction to 
competent arbitration institutions.4  
In the beginning, only two arbitration institutions were eligible to administer foreign-
related arbitration: the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”) and the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”).5 These two 
arbitration institutions rapidly dominated the alternative dispute resolution market in China.6 
Meanwhile, the Chinese institutional arbitration market has been rapidly expanding. In early 
2017, the number of arbitration institutions has quickly grown to 255, coming close to the 
maximum allowed by CAL.7 In some big cities, there are more than three local arbitration 
 
3 Standing Meeting National People’s Congress Law Commission, Interpretation on Arbitration Law of the 




5 Jian Zhou, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc 
Arbitration, 23 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 145, 148 (2006).  
 
6 Circular of the Regarding Some Problems Which Need to Be Clarified for the Implementation of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by General Office of the State Council, Jun. 8, 
1996, effective Jun. 8, 1996) Guo ban fa [1996] No 22, which provides that “the main duties of the reorganized 
arbitration commissions shall be to accept domestic arbitration cases. Where the parties to a foreign-related 
arbitration case voluntarily select arbitration by a reorganized arbitration commission, such commission may 
accept the case.” 
 
7 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 8th Standing Meeting Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective 1 Sept. 1, 1995), art 10 (China). “Arbitration commissions may be established in 
the municipalities directly under the Central Government, in the municipalities where the people's governments 
of provinces and autonomous regions are located or, if necessary, in other cities divided into districts. 






The Chinese institutional arbitration market is unprecedentedly prosperous and 
complicated due to competition and a delicate relationship among institutions.9 In 2015, for 
example, arbitration institutions located in mainland China administered 136,924 arbitration 
cases in total, 2,085 of which were foreign-related arbitrations. The total disputed monetary 
amount reached 411.2 billion RMB.10 In 2016, CIETAC administered 2,183 arbitration 
cases, 485 of which were foreign-related.11 Demonstrated by these numbers, CIETAC has 
rapidly grown into one of the busiest arbitration institutions in the world. 
The Chinese prohibition of ad hoc arbitration has eventually led to an awkward dilemma 
in arbitral practice. According to Article I of the New York Convention (“the Convention”) on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, both ad hoc and institutional 
arbitral awards can be recognized and enforced.12 Therefore, if an ad hoc arbitral award is 
rendered correctly in a signatory of the Convention and submitted for the enforcement in 
mainland China, Chinese courts must recognize and enforce the award. Ironically, an ad hoc 
arbitral award rendered in mainland China will be set aside or refused enforcement due to an 
 
8 For example, there are CIETAC Shanghai Commission, Shanghai Arbitration Commission and Shanghai 
International Arbitration Center in Shanghai, China. Shenzhen and Guangzhou also have same situation. 
 
9 Chen Meng, Is CIETAC Breaking Apart? An Analysis of the Split in the CIETAC System, 6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA 
ARB. J. 107 (2013). 
 
10 China Academy of Arbitration Law, CHINESE ARBITRATION ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 26-30 (2016). 
 
11 CIETAC, Statistics, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=40&l=en (last visited Sep. 30, 
2017). 
 
12 The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 38, art I, 
“The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also 





invalid arbitration agreement subject to CAL. Concisely, all arbitration agreements 
designating ad hoc arbitration that are governed by the CAL will be considered invalid and 
will consequently make arbitral awards unenforceable under the Convention. The situation 
becomes more complicated when it involves Hong Kong and Macau, which have legal 
systems that are comparatively independent from that of mainland China. The mutual 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards among mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Macau is governed by several arrangements issued by the SPC.13 These arrangements 
provide grounds for refusing enforcement that are similar to those of the Convention.14 
Because both Hong Kong and Macau arbitration laws allow ad hoc arbitration, ad hoc arbitral 
awards rendered in Hong Kong and Macau are enforceable in mainland China, while the 
reverse is not the case.15 Hong Kong and Macau, therefore, become perfect places to conduct 
ad hoc arbitration and avoid the negative influence of CAL.  
Even though forum shopping or designating a foreign governing law to validate ad hoc 
arbitration agreements16 are two possible solutions to getting around CAL,17 Chinese courts 
have consistently struggled over deciding the validity of various ad hoc arbitration 
 
13 Arrangements of the Supreme People’s Court on the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the 
Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 1, 2000) 
Fa shi [2000] No 3; Arrangement between the Mainland and the Macau SAR on Reciprocal Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 1, 2008) Fa shi [2007] No 17. 
 
14 HUANG YAYING, CHINESE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW COURSE 320 (Xiamen University Press, 2017). 
 
15 Gu Weixia, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration Agreements in China: Has The SPC-led Proarbitration 
Move Gone Far Enough? 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50 (2009); José Alejandro Carballo Leyda, A Uniform, 
Internationally Oriented Legal Framework for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan? 6 CHINESE J. INTL’ L. 345, 345(2007). 
 
16 Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations (promulgated by the Standing Meeting 
National People’s Congress, 28 October 2010, effective 1 April 2011), Art 18. 
 
17 Tietie Zhang, Enforceability of Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreements in China: China’s Incomplete Ad Hoc 




agreements.18 In many cases, the SPC has insisted that purely domestic disputants cannot 
select foreign arbitration laws to govern their ad hoc arbitration agreements or select Hong 
Kong or other foreign seats of arbitration to get around CAL.19 Therefore, even though 
choice-of-law rule and forum shopping can save some ad hoc arbitration agreements, unfair 
treatment between purely domestic and extraterritorial ad hoc arbitral awards makes the 
unique Chinese practice of prohibiting ad hoc arbitration less and less reasonable. 
b Relaxing restrictions on the validity of ad hoc arbitration agreements 
   Even though the CAL requires a valid arbitration agreement to designate a qualified 
arbitral institution, the Chinese judicial system has consistently utilized its powers of 
interpretation and discretion to save as many arbitration agreements as possible.  
In October 1995, only two months after CAL took effect, the SPC, in its Reply to the 
Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province, stated that parties of foreign-related cases can 
select ad hoc arbitration held in a foreign country.20 Despite potential conflicts with CAL and 
inconsistent judicial practices, the SPC was inclined to enforce arbitration agreements 
 
18 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
  
19 Zhao Xiuwen, Arbitrating Disputes with Chinese Entities in RENMIN UNIVERSITY CHINA LAW SUMMER 
TEACHING MATERIALS 114, 118-9 (2004); Jingzhou Tao, Salient Issues in Arbitration in China, 27 AM. U. INT'L 
L. REV. 807, 826 (2012). 
 
20 Prod. Materials Corp. of Fujian Province v. Jinge Shipping Co. Ltd., 1995 FA HAN NO. 135, Oct.20, 1995 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 1995). In foreign-related cases where parties have agreed in the contract in advance or 
reached an agreement after the dispute occurs that the dispute should be arbitrated by a foreign ad hoc 
arbitration institution or nonpermanent arbitration institution, the validity of such an arbitration agreement 





designating ad hoc arbitration to resolve foreign-related disputes outside of China.21  
Subsequently, in a 1996 judicial ruling, the SPC instructed the High People’s Court of 
Fujian Province to hold an ad hoc arbitration agreement valid based on the parties having 
selected ICC arbitration rules, which implied that they had selected the ICC as their 
administrating arbitral institution.22 In 2003, the SPC issued a draft version of the Provisions 
on Handling Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad by People's 
Courts (“Draft Provision”),23 which included the following articles: 
Article 20. People’s courts should hold arbitration agreements invalid in case 
of [the] following situations: . . . (6) agreed arbitration institution does not exist 
or agreed ad hoc arbitration[,] but the arbitration agreement does not provide 
rules for constituting arbitral tribunal, and parties could not reach supplemental 
agreement. . . . 
Article 26. Parties agreed an institutional arbitration rule to govern the 
arbitration rather than submit their disputes to the arbitration institution, the 
People’s Courts should consider [that] the arbitration institution can administer 
the disputes. . . . 
 Article 27. An ad hoc arbitration agreement will not be valid unless the 
domestic law of each party's country recognizes ad hoc arbitration and . . . all 
parties to the arbitration must come from contracting countries of the New York 
Convention.24 
The Draft Provision reflected that, the SPC’s approach regarding the validity of ad hoc 
 
21 Jian Zhou, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc 
Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 145, 166 (2006). Nove Nordisk v. Hainan Ji Zhong, 1996 FA JING HAN NO. 499, 
Dec. 20, 1996 (Sup. People’s Ct. 1996) (holding that an arbitration agreement designating London as the place 
of arbitration was invalid because the parties failed to choose an arbitral institution). 
  
22 Weige Wood Craft Ltd. Co. v. Taiwan Fuyuan Enterprise Ltd. Co., 1996 FA FA NO. 78 (Sup. People’s Ct. 
1996). 
 
23 Supreme People’s Ct., Provisions on Handling Foreign-Related arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated 
Abroad by People’s Courts, People’s Court Daily, Dec. 31, 2003, at 1-3. 
  




arbitration agreements has gone through the following fundamental changes. First, ad hoc 
arbitration taking place outside of China is now acceptable. Second, an arbitration agreement 
designating existing institutional rules can be read as implicitly designating the relevant 
institution; it thus conforms to CAL. Third, Article 20(6) of the Draft Provision implies that 
ad hoc arbitration agreements that provide rules for constituting arbitral tribunals may be 
valid. In sum, the Draft Provision awkwardly indicates that ad hoc arbitration agreements 
between parties from New York Convention signatories are valid if the domestic law of all 
parties allows ad hoc arbitration. It was clear that the SPC attempted to take a completely 
different approach to CAL in the Draft Provision.  
There is a controversy, however, over the question of whether the SPC has exceeded its 
power of judicial interpretation by issuing these provisions, which were quite possibly in 
contradiction with the existing CAL. The immature Draft Provision indicated the SPC’s pro-
arbitration but still uncertain attitude towards ad hoc arbitration taking place in mainland 
China. Regrettably, the SPC deleted the above provisions in the official version of the judicial 
interpretation regarding foreign-related arbitration, which it issued later.25 The Draft 
Provision nonetheless had a profound influence on lower courts’ relevant practice. For 
example, the Xiamen Intermediate Court, applying the Draft Provision, held valid an ad hoc 
arbitration agreement asking for ad hoc arbitration to take place in Beijing, China following 
ICC arbitration rules.  
In XiangYu Group Co. v Mechel Trading AG (MTA), the Chinese company XiangYu signed 
 




a steel sales contract with MTA, a Swiss company. It included an arbitration clause providing 
that “disputes related to or which arise from this contract shall be arbitrated by one or more 
arbitrators according to ICC arbitration rules. Arbitration will take place in Beijing, China.”26 
At the beginning of its verdict, the Xiamen Intermediate Court declared that the arbitral 
clause was an ad hoc arbitration agreement, despite the fact that the CAL did not admit ad 
hoc arbitration in mainland China.27 The Court further explained, however, that according to 
the 2003 Draft Provision, the selection of ICC arbitration rules was enough for the 
constitution of arbitral tribunals, and it also implied that the ICC Arbitration Court shall 
administer the arbitration.28 The Court’s verdict was that the ad hoc arbitration clause was 
valid. This was the first valid arbitration agreement, which applied foreign institutional rules 
and permitted the parties to seek ad hoc arbitration in mainland China. Although no 
subsequent Chinese court decision has gone this far, the decision shows that the Chinese 
judicial system was exploring a legitimate approach to accepting ad hoc arbitration for 
foreign-related disputes no matter where the arbitration would take place. The SPC gradually 
expanded the range of valid ad hoc arbitration agreements to get around the CAL through the 
choice-of-law rule. In 2006, the SPC issued an official interpretation, providing: 
Article 16. The examination of the effectiveness of an agreement for arbitration which 
involves foreign interests shall be governed by the laws agreed upon between the parties 
concerned; if the parties concerned did not agree upon the applicable laws but have 
agreed upon the place of arbitration, the laws at the place of arbitration shall apply; if they 
neither agreed upon the applicable laws nor agreed upon the place of arbitration or the 
place of arbitration is not clearly agreed upon, the laws at the locality of the court shall 
 










 Theoretically, if parties can select a foreign governing law that allows ad hoc arbitration, 
the ad hoc arbitration agreement is valid. At the local level, the Beijing High Court offered an 
opinion providing that an ad hoc arbitration agreement will be considered valid if it is valid 
under the law in force at the place of arbitration, the seat of a designated arbitral institution, 
or the law chosen by parties.30 Despite these judicial opinions, it was still uncertain whether 
Chinese courts would apply a foreign governing law to validate an arbitration agreement 
asking for ad hoc arbitration to take place in mainland China.31  
Things became clearer when the Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil 
Relations (hereafter the Law on Application of Law) entered into force on April 1, 2011, 
providing that “[t]he parties may choose the laws applicable to arbitral agreement by 
agreement. If the parties do not choose, the laws at the locality of the arbitral authority or of 
the arbitration shall apply.”32 In 2013, in a reply to the Beijing High Court regarding a case 
involving an ad hoc arbitration clause designating arbitration in Hong Kong, the SPC stated 
that, according to Article 18 of the Law on Application of Law, the applicable law of the 
arbitration clause was the Hong Kong Arbitration Law, which allows ad hoc arbitration. The 
arbitration clause was therefore valid.33 
 
29 Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the “Arbitration Law of the People's Republic 
of China” (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Sept. 8, 2006), art 16, 2006 (China). 
 
30 Opinion Concerning Issues in Adjudicating Petitions for Ruling on Validity of Arbitration Agreement or for 
Setting Aside Arbitration Awards (Beijing Municipal High Court, Dec. 3, 1999) [hereafter “Beijing Opinion”]. 
 
31 Tietie Zhang, supra note 17, at 373-377. 
 
32 Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations, supra note 16, Art 18. 





In conclusion, current legitimate ad hoc arbitration agreements for foreign-related 
disputes include: (1) agreements asking for ad hoc arbitration outside of China, (2) 
agreements asking for ad hoc arbitration to be administered by a foreign arbitration 
institution, and (3) agreements applying foreign governing laws that allow ad hoc arbitration. 
Parties can choose a foreign arbitration law expressly or implicitly by designating a foreign 
place of arbitration to validate an ad hoc arbitration agreement. Most foreign-related disputes 
that are allowed to apply foreign governing laws can therefore move to ad hoc arbitration.34  
Subject to the CAL, ad hoc arbitration agreements for purely domestic disputes are 
strictly invalid. For example, in a 2004 case, an arbitration clause stated that “arbitration: ICC 
Rules, Shanghai shall apply.” The SPC concluded that this type of arbitration agreement, 
without designating an arbitration institution, is invalid.35 Interestingly, the Xiamen 
Intermediate Court had reached the opposite conclusion in the case, XiangYu Group Co. v 
Mechel Trading AG (MTA).36 In a case heard by the SPC in 2015, an arbitral clause signed 
by two Chinese companies provided for ad hoc arbitration in Beijing, China, which applied 
Chinese law.37 Citing Article 18 of the CAL, the SPC replied that the ad hoc arbitration 
 
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Nov. 28, 2013) Min si ta zi, No. 58, 2013 (China). 
 
34 Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) (promulgated by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Jan. 7, 2013) Fa Shi No. 27, 2013 (China)(regarding definition of foreign-related 
disputes); Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations, supra note 16, art. 4; Contract Law of 
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., March 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), 
Art 126, para. 2, 1999 (China). 
 
35 Letter of Reply of the Supreme People's Court to the Request for Instructions on the Case Concerning the 
Application of Zublin International GmbH and Wuxi Woke General Engineering Rubber Co., Ltd. for 
Determining the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. 2003, effective 
July 8, 2004) Min si ta zi, No. 23, 2004 (China). 
 
36 XiangYu Group Co, v Mechel Trading AG (MTA), supra note 26. 





clause was invalid because it did not designate a qualified arbitration institution.38 In a 
similar case, a disputed arbitration agreement between a Chinese company and a Singapore 
company applied the “Chinese Arbitration Rules” (the term “Chinese Arbitration Rules” does 
not exist and is not clear enough to designate an arbitration institution) and provided for 
arbitration in Zhuhai, China.39 However, Jin Wan District People’s Court held that because 
the seat of arbitration is Zhuhai, China, the parties have implicitly selected the Zhuhai 
Arbitration Commission to administer their disputes.40 Even though such reasoning is 
somewhat far-fetched, it shows that Chinese courts are willing to maximize their judicial 
discretion to validate ad hoc arbitration agreements as long as the relevant disputes involve 
foreign factors.41 
On the other hand, existing judicial practice confirms that purely domestic disputes will 
be governed by the CAL without any submission to foreign arbitration. In Siemens 
International Trade Ltd v Shanghai Gold Land Ltd, the two parties were both foreign-
invested companies registered in the Shanghai Free Trade Experimental Zone. The Shanghai 
 
Voyage Charter Party Between Zhong Hai North Logistic Ltd. and Ben Xi Bei Ying Steel Group Import Ltd. 




39 Chang Yu Jian She Ltd. v. SEMBAWANG ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORSPTE LTD, Zhu jin fa min 




41 The SPC, Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) (Fa shi [2012] 
No 24, 7 January 2013), Art 1. “Where a civil relationship falls under any of the following circumstances, the 
people's court may determine it as foreign-related civil relationship: 1. where either party or both parties are 
foreign citizens, foreign legal persons or other organizations or stateless persons; 2. where the habitual residence 
of either party or both parties is located outside the territory of the People's Republic of China; 3. where the 
subject matter is outside the territory of the People's Republic of China; 4. where the legal fact that leads to 
establishment, change or termination of civil relationship happens outside the territory of the People's Republic 





First Intermediate People’s Court held that even though this case did not involve the required 
foreign factors, Siemens International could nevertheless count as a foreign-related case 
because both parties are foreign-invested companies registered in the Shanghai Free Trade 
Experimental Zone.42 The parties were therefore allowed to select foreign arbitration 
institutions to administer their arbitration. Some scholars have claimed that the Chinese 
judicial system is expanding the range of foreign-related disputes, especially those that 
involve parties that are foreign-invested companies registered in FTZs, to promote the 
Chinese national policy of free trade zones and the “One Belt One Road” policy.43 It is 
reasonable to predict that Chinese courts will apply the same expansion when considering the 
validity of ad hoc arbitration agreements for resolving disputes between foreign-invested 
companies registered in FTZs.  
c Allowing Ad Hoc arbitration in Free Trade Zones  
  In the last days of 2016, the Chinese judicial system’s preference for enterprises 
registered in FTZs finally took shape in a remarkable announcement from the SPC entitled 
Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade Zones (hereafter the 
Advice).44 The Advice generally shows that the Chinese judicial system will support FTZs in 
several ways. Article 9 of the Advice stipulates, 
   One or both parties are foreign-invested companies registered in Free Trade Zones. 
 
42 Siemens International Trade Ltd v Shanghai Gold Land Ltd, Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court 
([2015] hu yi min si (shang) zhong zi No1555). 
 
43 GAO FEI & XU GUOJIAN, GUIDE FOR CHINA AD HOC ARBITRATION PRACTICE 46-8 (Fa lv Publishing, 2017). 
44 The SPC, Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade Zones (hereafter Advice) 
(Law )(Fa [2016] No. 34, 30 December 2016) , available at 





They agree to submit disputes to arbitration abroad. After disputes arise, the parties 
submit to the foreign arbitration and obtain an enforceable foreign arbitral award. 
People’s courts shall not support one party’s claim that such arbitration agreement is 
invalid… 
  People’s courts can consider agreements between companies registered in Free Trade 
Zones, for submitting their disputes to arbitration by specific arbitrators, for a specific 
arbitration, according to specific arbitration rules, to be valid. If people’s courts consider 
such agreements invalid, they should report this decision to higher courts for review. If 
the higher courts agree with the lower courts’ decision, they should report this decision to 
the SPC for review. They can only issue the verdict after the SPC confirms the decision.45  
 First, the Advice confirms that disputes involving foreign-invested companies registered 
in FTZs can be considered foreign-related disputes. Thus, these disputes are allowed to 
submit to arbitration abroad if no party challenges the arbitral jurisdiction before the arbitral 
awards are rendered. In particular, disputes between wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
registered in FTZs are allowed to submit to arbitration abroad. This implies that foreign-
invested companies registered in FTZs are also allowed to select ad hoc arbitration outside of 
China.  
 The Advice then expands the application of ad hoc arbitration to all companies registered 
in FTZs. The Advice stipulates four controversial requirements of legitimate ad hoc 
arbitration.46 The first requirement is that only disputes between companies registered in 
FTZs are allowed to submit to ad hoc arbitration. The second is that parties should designate 
specific rules to govern their ad hoc arbitration. The Advice does not clarify how specific this 
rule should be. For example, it is enough to provide ways of constituting arbitral tribunals, or 








is the case, it is more likely that most parties will choose to apply some widely-used 
international rules, like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or LMAA Terms. The third 
requirement is that parties should designate specific arbitrators. The SPC did not explain 
whether it requires parties to indicate the identities of selected arbitrators, which is 
unreasonable in practice. Moreover, the CAL stipulates several qualifications required of 
professionals who can be selected as arbitrators in Chinese institutional arbitration.47 It is 
uncertain whether the selected ad hoc arbitrators shall also fulfill these qualifications. Finally, 
the specific places referred to in the Advice are not limited to Chinese FTZs. Theoretically, ad 
hoc arbitration can take place in any corner of mainland China. 
 As the SPC has explained, so-called “specific arbitration” (ad hoc arbitration) is limited 
to companies registered in FTZs and can take place anywhere else in mainland China under 
proper judicial supervision.48 The SPC has said that if its experiment with ad hoc arbitration 
originating in FTZs works smoothly, it will expand the application of ad hoc arbitration to 
other areas of China and promote an appropriate revision of the CAL.49  
3 Available Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules 
 
47 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 1, Art 13 “The arbitration commission shall 
appoint fair and honest person as its arbitrators. Arbitrators must fulfil one of the following conditions: 1. they 
have been engaged in arbitration work for at least eight years; 2. they have worked as a lawyer for at least eight 
years; 3. they have been a judge for at least eight years; 4. they are engaged in legal research or legal teaching 
and in senior positions; and 5. they have legal knowledge and are engaged in professional work relating to 
economics and trade, and in senior positions or of the equivalent professional level. The arbitration commission 
shall establish a list of arbitrators according to different professionals.” 
 
48 The SPC, Interpreting and applying the Advice on Providing Judicial Supports for Establishing Free Trade 
Zones, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2017-01/18/05/2017011805_pdf.pdf (visited 30 
September 2017). 





 Ad hoc arbitration has many advantages compared with institutional arbitration. 
Theoretically, ad hoc arbitration is more flexible, quicker, and less expensive than 
institutional arbitration, but much depends on the arbitrators’ experience and availability to 
handle the matter.50 If the parties have not agreed on the rules for constituting arbitral 
tribunals and conducting arbitral proceedings in advance, it is highly possible that after 
disputes have arisen they will find themselves trapped in disagreements about every detail of 
arbitral proceedings. Additionally, applicable arbitration rules directly determine the 
effectiveness of arbitral proceedings. Most importantly, they determine whether parties will 
obtain an enforceable arbitral award.  
Furthermore, ad hoc arbitration is quite vulnerable to delay tactics and litigant strategies.51 
Any delay and deficiency in ad hoc arbitral proceedings greatly increases the expense of the 
dispute resolution. Therefore, commentators have insisted that parties should include detailed 
procedural rules in arbitration clauses for potential procedural obstacles.52 However, 
considering the complexity of international trade and the comparatively limited time that 
parties spend on dispute resolution provisions, it is not likely that parties spend much time 
negotiating obscure ad hoc arbitration clauses. In practice, many contracts regularly include 
simple words, like “arbitration in London,” to designate ad hoc arbitration. It is often 
 
50 1  Bette J. Roth, Randall W. Wulff, & Charles A. Cooper, Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Guide § 
19:14 (Westlaw, 2016); Duncan Mackay & Kathleen Bryan, ‘Ad Hoc Arbitration Keeps Costs Down’ A Special 
Report, NAT’L L. J. (2009); Samuel T. Reaves, Self-Administered Arbitration: Something Worth Considering, 
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recommended that parties adopt pre-established arbitration rules to govern their ad hoc 
arbitration.53 Because the Advice requires parties to include specific arbitration rules in 
agreements, it is necessary that arbitration rules for Chinese ad hoc arbitration be available. 
 Many entities provide arbitration rules for ad hoc arbitration. A set of arbitration rules 
covers all aspects of the arbitral process, including a model arbitration clause. It sets out rules 
regarding the appointment of arbitrators, arbitral proceedings, the calculation of arbitration 
expenses, and the form, effect and interpretation of arbitral awards. Parties can simply 
incorporate well-established arbitration rules in agreements to guarantee the effectiveness of 
their ad hoc arbitration. The most widely known rule set is the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon 
which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of their 
commercial relationship and are widely used in both ad hoc and administered arbitration.54 
Except for the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, there are other rules often used in ad hoc 
arbitration. Examples include the London Maritime Arbitrators Association Terms (LMAA 
Terms)55 and the Paris Home of International Arbitration Rules.56 
Because China has no relevant tradition or previous experience, the time and legal 
resources needed to establish more mature procedural rules for a future ad hoc arbitration 
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market are limited. But the Chinese arbitration community is definitely on its way. Soon after 
the SPC announced the Advice, the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission took the lead in 
publishing the Heng Qin Free Trade Experiment Zone Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules (hereafter 
Heng Qin Rules) in March 2017.57 The Heng Qin Rules are based on both the Zhuhai 
Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with minor 
modifications based on features of ad hoc arbitration that originated in Heng Qin FTZ. In 
addition, some Chinese practitioners have endeavored to contribute their experience to 
drafting Chinese ad hoc arbitration model rules.58 The entire Chinese community has 
consistently declared that, because China has a special background regarding ad hoc 
arbitration, the production of tailor-made ad hoc arbitration rules to meet the specific needs of 
Chinese companies is essential. The truth is that China has ambitions to achieve greater 
speaking rights in cross-border trade and to reconstruct international economic order.59 The 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), for example, 
recently released Arbitration Rules on International Investment Disputes.60 Producing its 
own ad hoc arbitration rules is, therefore, imperative in the foreseeable future.  
Arbitration rules are applied to streamline arbitral proceedings in order to prevent and 
overcome potential causes of delay and inefficiency. In order to establish integrated and 
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mature procedural rules, China has to incorporate mechanisms to overcome the inherent 
deficiencies and challenges that are expected in ad hoc arbitral proceedings. To examine the 
essential components of well-established ad hoc arbitration rules, this research compares the 
following aspects of the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules, the London Maritime Arbitrator 
Association Terms 2017 (hereafter LMAA 2017), and the Heng Qin Rules: (1) the model 
clause; (2) the sphere of application; (3) the default appointing authorities; (4) the solution 
when parties fail to appoint arbitrators; (5) the qualifications of arbitrators; (6) the extra 
power of arbitral tribunals on optimizing efficiency of the arbitral proceeding; (7) the 
exclusion of liability; (8) the place of arbitration; (9) multiple parties; (10) interim measures; 
(11) form and enforceability of arbitral awards; (12) mediation and settlement; (13) fees. A 





 UNICITRAL Arbitration Law (December 
16, 2013) 
LMAA Terms 2017 (May 1, 2017) Heng Qin Free Trade Experiment 
Zone Ad Hoc Arbitration Rules (April 
15, 2017) 
Model Clause Any dispute, controversy or claim arising 
out of or relating to this contract, or the 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, 
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Note. Parties should consider adding: 
(a) The appointing authority shall be . . . 
[name of institution or person]; 
(b) The number of arbitrators shall be . . . 
[one or three]; 
(c) The place of arbitration shall be . . . 
[town and country]; 
(d) The language to be used in the arbitral 
proceedings shall be . . . 
This contract is governed by English law and all 
disputes arising under or in connection with it shall be 
referred to arbitration in London. Arbitration shall be 
conducted in accordance with one of the following 
LMAA procedures applicable at the date of the 
commencement of the arbitral proceedings: … 
(iii) In any case where the LMAA procedures referred to 
above do not apply, the reference shall be to three 
arbitrators in accordance with the LMAA Terms current 




Article 1. Parties agreed their disputes shall 
be referred to arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, including 
investor-State arbitration. 
Article 4-7. Parties agreed, sole arbitrator or both the 
original arbitrators are full Members of the Association.  
Article 3. Any statements that can be 
reasonably concluded to mean that the 




Article 6. Parties may agree on any person 
or institution. Absence of agreement, any 
party may request the Secretary-General of 
the PCA to designate the appointing 
authority. 
Not provided  Article 20. The appointing authority is 
the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission 
unless parties agree otherwise. 
Solution when 
parties fail to 
Article 7-9. The appointing authority shall 
appoint the second arbitrator or a sole 
Article 10. The provisions of section 17 of the Act will 
apply unless the parties agree otherwise. “The other 







arbitrator. party, having duly appointed his arbitrator, may give 
notice in writing to the party in default that he proposes 
to appoint his arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator.”61 
Qualification of 
arbitrators 
Not provided Not provided Article 20. Arbitrators should fulfill the 
requirements of the CAL.62 
Extra Power of 
the arbitral 
tribunal  
Not provided Article 16. The tribunal shall have the following specific 
powers to be exercised in a suitable case so as to avoid 




Article 16. Excluding liability except for 
intentional wrongdoing. 
Not provided Article 59. The Zhuhai Arbitration 
Commission and its staff are exempted 




Article 18. Parties agree or determined by 
the arbitral tribunal in the absence of 
agreement. 
Article 6. The seat of the arbitration is in England unless 
parties agree otherwise. 
Article 6. The place of arbitration is in 
Zhuhai unless parties agreed otherwise. 
Multiple parties Article 10. Multiple parties jointly appoint 
an arbitrator. 
Not provided Article 36. Other party may join the 
arbitration at the request of any party, by 
discretion of the arbitral tribunal. 
Interim Measures  Article 26. The arbitral tribunal may grant 
interim measures. 
Not provided Article 13. The arbitral tribunal may 




Article 34. All awards shall be made in 
writing and shall be final and binding on the 
parties. The arbitral tribunal shall give 
reasons unless parties agreed otherwise. 
Article 22-28. The arbitral tribunal shall give reasons 
unless parties agreed otherwise. 
Article 43. All awards shall be made in 
writing and shall be final and binding on 
the parties. The arbitral tribunal shall 
give reasons unless parties agreed 
otherwise. 
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Article 36. At parties’ request, the arbitral 
tribunals may record the settlement into an 
award. 
Article 18 & 19. Parties shall inform the arbitral tribunal 
of the settlement. 
Article 37 & 38. The arbitral tribunal 
should review the settlement agreement 
and record it in a settlement statement or 
award at parties’ request. The arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the mediation at 
parties’ request. 
Fees Article 40-41. The arbitral tribunal shall fix 
the costs of arbitration. The fees should be 
reasonable, taking into account any schedule 
or particular method for determining the 
fees for arbitrators applied by the appointing 
authority. 
Article 13 and The First Schedule Provisions set out fees 
payable to the tribunal and other related matters. 
Article 17 & 18. Parties should negotiate 
fees with arbitrators. In absence of 
agreement, the appointing authority or 
Zhuhai Arbitration Commission 
determine the fees. 
Other rules - Intermediate Claims Procedure (ICP), Small Claims 
Procedure (SCP), Fast and Low Cost Arbitration 
(FALCA), and Mediation Terms. 
Article 47. After review, Zhuhai 
Arbitration Commission can transform 
an ad hoc arbitral award to an 








Ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration rules have much in common regarding 
arbitral procedures, multiple parties, interim measures, the form and enforceability of arbitral 
awards, and the like. The biggest difference between ad hoc and institutional arbitration is 
whether an arbitration institution is designated to administer the entire proceeding. Where 
arbitration institutions are not involved, the ad hoc arbitration rules allocate administrative 
responsibilities to other participants.  
The first function of ad hoc arbitration rules is to direct communication between parties 
and arbitrators regarding the organization of the arbitral proceedings. The claimant is 
normally in charge of communication and notification before an arbitral tribunal is created.63 
Once the arbitral tribunal is formed, the arbitral tribunal will then direct the proceeding. The 
organization of the arbitral tribunal is, therefore, crucial to conduct the arbitral proceeding. 
The three above-mentioned sets of arbitration rules all provide multiple solutions to guarantee 
the formation of arbitral tribunals, especially when parties cannot reach an agreement on how 
to compose a tribunal, or when one party fails to appoint an arbitrator. Both the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and the Heng Qin Rules stipulate that, by default, appointing authorities 
shall appoint arbitrators, while the LMAA Terms 2017 delegate the performing party to 
appoint a sole arbitrator.64 Additionally, all three sets of rules provide a default place of 
arbitration where parties have failed to reach an agreement.65 Moreover, the three sets of 
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rules have similar provisions for determining the allocation of fees.66 In negotiating fees with 
arbitrators, parties must account for the complexity of the case and analyze any methods used 
by the appointing authority for determining arbitration fees. 
In other respects, the three sets of rules include unique provisions. Both the Heng Qin 
Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules allow arbitral tribunals to record the parties’ 
settlement into arbitral awards, while the LMAA Terms 2017 require only that parties inform 
the arbitral tribunal that they have reached a settlement.67 Furthermore, only the Heng Qin 
Rules allow the arbitral tribunal to conduct mediation at the parties’ request.68 In addition, 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules exempt arbitrators from liability, apart from intentional 
wrongdoing.69 Finally, the Heng Qin Rules only exempt its promulgator, the Zhuhai 
Arbitration Commission, and its staff, from liability,70 while the LMAA Terms are silent on 
arbitrator liability.  
Regarding arbitrator qualifications, parties can theoretically select anyone as their 
arbitrators because there is no list of arbitrators provided in ad hoc arbitration. Neither the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules nor the LMAA Terms 2017 impose limitations on the 
qualifications of arbitrators, while the Heng Qin Rules stipulate that selected arbitrators 
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should fulfill the CAL’s requirements.71 Remarkably, the Heng Qin Rules include an 
interesting provision that permits the arbitral tribunal to transfer ad hoc arbitral awards into 
institutional awards, which are endorsed by the Zhuhai Arbitration Commission at the parties’ 
request.72 Permitting ad hoc awards to be transferred into institutional awards obviously aims 
to avoid any potential violation of the CAL and increase the enforceability of the awards. 
In the end, the LMAA Terms 2017 place greater emphasis on increasing procedural 
efficiency. For example, the rules delegate specific powers to arbitral tribunals to avoid 
unnecessary delay or expense, which include the ability to limit the discovery of evidence 
and to punish parties who refuse to cooperate.73 The LMAA Terms also provide useful tools 
for streamlining arbitral proceedings. The questionnaire and checklist provided in the end of 
the Terms, for example, can help arbitrators explore the most appropriate way of progressing 
through an arbitration. Remarkably, the LMAA establishes specific procedural rules for 
disputes where claimants have claimed less than US$400,000 (LMAA Intermediate Claims 
Procedure), less than US$100,000 (LMAA Small Claims Procedure), less than US$250,000 
(Fast and Low Cost Arbitration) and Mediation Terms.74 The LMAA Terms thus provide a 
wide range of procedural rules suitable for small claim disputes. Coincidently, in recent years 
most arbitration institutions have followed this method to provide expedited procedural rules 
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for small claims.75 The method is a promising direction for the international arbitration 
community, enabling it to develop diversified and more efficient service. 
In conclusion, ad hoc arbitration rules and institutional rules provide similar provisions for 
conducting arbitration procedures, which offer specific instruments to promote the formation 
of arbitral tribunals, determine fees, and guarantee procedural efficiency. Ad hoc arbitration 
rules also often include provisions regarding the model clause, sphere of application, liability 
of arbitrators, expedited procedures for small claims, and the like. In addition, to support ad 
hoc arbitration taking place in mainland China, arbitration rules should mandate specific 
considerations regarding the qualifications of arbitrators, default places of arbitration, and 
default appointing authorities.  
4 Constructing a Chinese ad hoc arbitration regime 
The SPC’s movement to test ad hoc arbitration in FTZs is the beginning of an overall 
reform of the Chinese arbitration regime. The international community has witnessed China 
rapidly develop a mature and characteristic institutional arbitration regime. Most existing 
laws and regulations are specifically tailored for institutional arbitration. The SPC’s judicial 
interpretation and judges’ discretion are limited. Currently, the scarcity of legal resources, 
available arbitration rules, judicial support and human resources is producing great 
uncertainty around Chinese ad hoc arbitration. The SPC’s small step of confirming the 
validity of some ad hoc arbitration agreements is far from sufficient to enable mainland China 
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to construct a complete ad hoc arbitration regime. Unless China revises its arbitration law and 
garners more judicial support, parties who select ad hoc arbitration in mainland China will 
remain burdened by many procedural and enforcement risks.  
a Debates regarding Chinese ad hoc arbitration 
The SPC’s acceptance of ad hoc arbitration originating in FTZs greatly inspires the 
Chinese arbitration community’s confidence in promoting Chinese ad hoc arbitration. Many 
practitioners have asserted that we have reached the moment for dramatically expanding ad 
hoc arbitration.76 However, before this moment really arrives, several issues need to be 
properly addressed.  
The first issue is whether it is necessary to promote or allow ad hoc arbitration in mainland 
China. After all, as empirical research has shown, it is possible that disputants will end up 
spending a great deal of time and money on inefficient ad hoc arbitral proceedings without 
receiving an enforceable arbitral award.77 Many inherent deficiencies are to be expected in 
the application of ad hoc arbitration in mainland China, especially if the Chinese legal system 
is not well prepared for it.78 To give China the determination to revise its arbitration law and 
tradition and to embrace ad hoc arbitration, practitioners should prove that ad hoc arbitration 
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is a necessary part of a modern commercial dispute resolution regime. To some extent, the 
most important reason for China to promote ad hoc arbitration is not that it is cheaper or more 
flexible for resolving international commercial disputes. Establishing a completed ad hoc 
arbitration regime is necessary to coordinate Chinese arbitration with international practice, 
and to increase the influence of Chinese arbitral experience.79 Incorporating ad hoc 
arbitration is also a significant step toward enacting the Chinese national policy of “One Belt 
One Road” and other investment arrangements.80   
If ad hoc arbitration does indeed prove desirable in mainland China, the next issue is 
whether we should limit the application of ad hoc arbitration to foreign-related disputes or 
FTZ disputes. This author believes that a determination as to whether it is necessary to 
expand ad hoc arbitration to purely domestic disputes depends on whether the demand for 
domestic dispute resolution will seriously exceed the capacity of Chinese arbitration 
institutions. The fact that the number of Chinese arbitration institutions is rapidly 
approaching the maximum number allowed by the CAL suggests that a domestic Chinese 
arbitration market has great potential.81 Moreover, distinguishing international, foreign-
related ad hoc arbitration from purely domestic ad hoc arbitration is impractical and will, in 
practice, cause a great deal of confusion.82 The SPC’s Advice aims to initiate a major reform 
of the Chinese arbitration system, not only in ad hoc arbitration, but also in the sphere of 
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foreign-related disputes, and eventually to expand such experience to the national level.83  
If China allows ad hoc arbitration to resolve both foreign-related and purely domestic 
disputes, the next challenge is whether Chinese companies and practitioners are willing to 
select ad hoc arbitration rather than other dispute resolution methods with which they are 
more familiar and for which they have trained. First of all, the Advice only delegates more 
discretion to courts for validating relevant ad hoc arbitration agreements. Without further 
judicial and legislative guidelines, practitioners remain in doubt about how far the Chinese 
judicial system will go toward supporting ad hoc arbitration. Potential violations of the CAL 
is an inevitable threat for Chinese courts that expand their discretion and also affects the 
extent to which Chinese companies are motivated to select ad hoc arbitration. Other 
psychological factors also negatively influence the accessibility of ad hoc arbitration. One 
practitioner pointed out that arbitrators are generally uncomfortable about negotiating fees 
directly with parties.84 Considering that some well-known arbitrators are already 
overwhelmed with institutional appointments, it is clear that the number of arbitrators 
available for ad hoc arbitration is limited. Counselors may also be reluctant to suggest ad hoc 
arbitration to their clients unless they have plenty of relevant experience. Until China 
properly addresses these challenges, the Chinese ad hoc arbitration market will not take off. 
b Uniform Chinese ad hoc arbitration rules 
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Availability of arbitration rules is necessary for developing Chinese ad hoc arbitration. A 
comparison of two popular international sets of rules and the Heng Qin Rules indicates that, 
although the three sets of arbitration rules all aim to streamline arbitral proceedings, they 
each have their own features. The Heng Qin Rules have special provisions related to default 
appointing authority, arbitrators’ qualifications, and transforming ad hoc arbitral awards to 
institutional awards.85 All these features reflect a specific Chinese conception of ad hoc 
arbitration. China has an enormous and complicated institutional arbitration market. Most 
arbitration institutions located in metropolitan areas that have FTZs are interested in 
capturing the emerging ad hoc arbitration market. The Zhuhai Arbitration Commission, for 
example, established the Heng Qin Rules designating the Commission as the default 
appointing authority.86 In some cities that have FTZs, there are at least three local arbitration 
institutions.87 If every institution attempts to participate in the ad hoc arbitration market by 
providing ad hoc arbitration rules, the entire Chinese ad hoc arbitration system will be 
devastated by increased confusion between institutional and ad hoc arbitration. Furthermore, 
it is unreasonable for each FTZ to establish its own ad hoc arbitration rules. China currently 
has twelve FTZs and more will probably be established in the future. China needs integrated 
and internationalized arbitration rules that focus on streamlining and increasing the efficiency 
of arbitral proceedings. Therefore, China needs a more qualified entity to establish rules 
tailored for FTZ ad hoc arbitration. The author believes that the China Council for the 
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Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) or a national arbitrator association are the 
competent authorities to take on this responsibility. In addition, rules that relate to default 
appointing authority and places of arbitration must be modified from a national perspective. 
The default appointing authorities, for example, could be the local courts for the FTZs in 
which the parties register, while the default places of arbitration could be the cities where 
parties or respondents register. In 2015, for example, the SPC established a permanent circuit, 
named the SPC First Circuit, in Shenzhen, Guangdong. The First Circuit hears cases and 
appeals from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces. Under the auspices of the SPC, 
the First Circuit in Guangdong Province can take on judicial supervision responsibilities for 
ad hoc arbitration originating in three FTZs (Qian Hai FTZ, Nan Sha FTZ and Heng Qin 
FTZ).  
c Confirming judicial supervision on ad hoc arbitration 
The CAL’s requirement that all arbitration agreements designate a qualified arbitration 
commission is the source of all obstacles in Chinese ad hoc arbitration. The Chinese judicial 
system, led by the SPC, has taken many approaches to overcome the limitations of the CAL. 
Currently, parties of foreign-related disputes can choose foreign governing laws or seats of 
arbitration outside of mainland China to avoid applying the CAL. The SPC further expands 
the application of ad hoc arbitration to disputes between companies registered in FTZs. 
Theoretically, companies registered in FTZs can stipulate that their ad hoc arbitration will 
take place anywhere in mainland China. The implication is that if ad hoc arbitration works 





China.88 Even though the SPC has taken the lead in reforming Chinese arbitration, its 
potential violation of the CAL still impedes ad hoc arbitral practice. Without further 
confirmation in the form of legislation, practitioners will be reluctant to have their ad hoc 
arbitration take place in China because it may be considered illegitimate. Until China revises 
the CAL the ad hoc arbitration will make up only a small proportion of the Chinese dispute 
resolution market.  
  The SPC’s Advice is basically a declaration for enhancing judicial support for dispute 
resolutions originating in FTZs and delegating judges more discretion in deciding the validity 
of ad hoc arbitration agreements. More judicial supervision lies in courts’ authority to set 
aside and enforce ad hoc arbitral awards. The good news is that Chinese courts may not set 
aside ad hoc arbitral awards based on ad hoc arbitration agreements being found invalid after 
the Advice was published. Because ad hoc arbitration that takes place on mainland China 
between two Chinese companies does not fall within the sphere of the New York Convention, 
setting aside and enforcing Chinese ad hoc arbitral awards is subject to Chinese Law. The 
provisions provided in CAL and Chinese Civil Procedure Law regarding the setting aside and 
enforcement of arbitral awards are all specifically applied to institutional arbitration.89 The 
SPC could make legal interpretation to modify and expand existing national laws to ad hoc 
arbitral awards. It could, for example, announce that people’s courts located in places of 
arbitration or related FTZs have the jurisdiction to set aside ad hoc arbitral awards based on 
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the same statutory grounds for setting aside institutional awards. In addition, it is expected 
that the inconsistent Chinese laws for setting aside and enforcing purely domestic and 
foreign-related arbitral awards will increase the complexity of judicial supervision in FTZ ad 
hoc arbitration.90 In a word, there is a long way to go for China to provide adequate legal 
resources for ad hoc arbitration. 
d Human resources 
The experience and skills of arbitrators directly determine the quality of ad hoc arbitration. 
Because China has never previously had an ad hoc arbitration system, Chinese arbitrators 
have less experience of managing cases without the assistance of arbitration institutions. 
There are certainly many experienced ad hoc arbitrators in the international market, but they 
may not be familiar with Chinese substantive law, which will very possibly become the 
governing law in disputes between two companies registered in FTZs. Nor does the Advice 
stipulate the required qualifications for persons to be selected as ad hoc arbitrators. Some 
have suggested that the relevant provisions in the CAL should apply.91 Even if that were the 
case, however, this would still not be enough to ensure that Chinese ad hoc arbitration would 
be in good hands.  
Currently, China has a large group of arbitrators appointed by approximately 255 
arbitration institutions. The number of arbitrators who possess the experience and ability to 
administer ad hoc arbitral proceedings is much smaller, however. Apart from informal 
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institutional guidelines, moreover, China has not established any official ethical regulations 
for arbitrators. Notably, Article 399 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
establishes criminal liability for arbitrators for intentional violations of the law.92 Most 
ethical problems among arbitrators are not serious enough to trigger criminal liabilities, 
however.93 Ethic rules and guidelines for the professional responsibilities of arbitrators are 
still a vacuum in the Chinese arbitration system. Apart from the Criminal Law, there are no 
official provisions to regulate the behavior of arbitrators in ad hoc arbitration. The Chinese 
arbitration community cannot deny that corruption and negligence are serious ongoing 
problems.94 The purpose of establishing ethical rules for arbitrators is to prevent unethical 
behavior by arbitrators from depriving parties of fair arbitral proceedings and awards—not 
throwing misbehavior arbitrators into jail. The best way to prevent potential violations is, 
first, to clarify what kinds of behavior are prohibited or need to be disclosed at the beginning 
of arbitral proceedings and, second, to establish liability rules and effective remedy methods. 
Finally, a national code of ethics for arbitrators is also essential to the overall development of 
the Chinese arbitration system. 
5 Conclusion 
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  China has a singular tradition of institutional arbitration due to the CAL’s prohibition of ad 
hoc arbitration. To develop and internationalize Chinese arbitration, the SPC made many pro-
arbitration moves in an effort to alleviate the restrictions imposed by the CAL. Parties in 
foreign-related disputes are allowed to select ad hoc arbitration by choosing foreign 
governing law or seats of arbitration outside of China. In 2017, the SPC expanded this 
permission to ad hoc arbitration between companies registered in FTZs. It is also possible for 
the SPC to further expand the FTZ experience to the whole of mainland China. This article 
has shown that even though the SPC experimentally opened ad hoc arbitration for FTZ-
originated cases, the current Chinese arbitration system is far from ready to conduct effective 
ad hoc arbitral proceedings. After examining the judicial history and official guidelines 
regarding FTZ ad hoc arbitration, this author asserts that the parties should, at a minimum, 
provide rules for constituting arbitral tribunals, organizing arbitral proceedings, and selecting 
specific places of arbitration in order to make ad hoc arbitration agreements valid. Providing 
effective arbitration rules tailored for FTZ ad hoc arbitration is essential for fulfilling these 
requirements. Instead of transplanting international rules or applying domestic rules 
promulgated by certain arbitration institutions, this article has explained that China should 
delegate more qualified entities to establish uniform ad hoc arbitration rules at the national 
level. Furthermore, China is completely lacking in the legal resources, judicial supervision, 
and human resources required for ad hoc arbitration. This deficiency will eventually prevent 
parties from being able to select such arbitration. In consequence, China should reform its 





confirming judicial supervision responsibilities and training practitioners to prepare for the 
emergence of a full-fledged, nationwide ad hoc arbitration market. 
